We present a comprehensive, two-stage model of the venture capital contracting process, incorporating moral hazard and asymmetric information problems. The structure of the model, involving managerial effort, staged investment, and later-stage syndication, replicates what we know empirically of venture-capital financing. An entrepreneur raises funding for a positive NPV project by selling shares in the project. Terms-of-financing must take into account incentives for entrepreneur effort. After the entrepreneur's effort provision, if performance is strong, the entrepreneur will raise funds in the next financing stage, until the project is ultimately cashed out.
Introduction
This paper develops a model to study how entrepreneurs and venture capital investors deal with adverse selection, moral hazard, effort provision, and hold-up problems. How efficient is venture capital financing? How much value is lost in the venture capital relationship relative to the first-best? How severe is the under-investment problem startup firms are facing? Is venture capital financing generally more efficient for high-variance firms? Are there significant efficiency gains from syndication of later stage financing? These are the questions that we seek to answer.
To address these questions we use a computational corporate finance model. We define computational corporate finance as the formal study of financing and investment problems that do not have closed-form solutions, except possibly in special cases. Economic analysis of such problems naturally starts with the modeling of institutions and their behavior. But at some point the search for further economic insights requires numerical evaluation of these models.
Numerical methods are frequently used to understand the value of real options, but their use on the financing side of the balance sheet is an infant industry. The short list of computational papers on financing includes Mello and Parsons (1992) , Leland (1994 Leland ( , 1998 , Parrino and Weisbach (1999) , Robe (1999) and Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach (2002) . These papers explore the tradeoff theory of capital structure and the risk-shifting incentives created by debt financing.
We believe the time is ripe for a computational model of venture capital. Venture capital institutions, contracts and procedures were well documented more than a decade ago. It was clear then that the agency and information problems encountered in ordinary financing decisions are especially acute in venture capital. Entrepreneurs and venture capital investors have to deal with adverse selection, moral hazard, effort provision, and the threat of ex post holdups, often in the presence of asymmetric information. The successes of venture capital have stimulated theoretical work on how these problems are mitigated. But most theoretical papers have highlighted only one problem or one feature in venture capital contracting in order to obtain a closed-form solution of the problem.
We combine the most important problems of the entrepreneur-venture capital relationship. Our model has no closed form solution, but we can use numerical methods to estimate the likely magnitudes of agency and information problems and to show how these problems affect startup values and the terms of financing. Although we do not fully explain the observed structure of venture capital financing, we can analyze why the structure works when it works and why it fails when it doesn't.
if the startup has positive NPV overall. Secondly, the entrepreneur has to share her marginal value added by the entrepreneur with the investor. 1 Thus the entrepreneur has an incentive to underinvest in effort at the margin.
The structure of venture-capital financing is known from many sources, including Sahlman (1990) , Lerner (1994) , Gompers (1995) , Gompers and Lerner (1999) , Hellman and Puri (2001, 2002) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) . The following features of venture capital contracting are important to our paper.
Sweat equity.
The entrepreneur invests even when she puts up none of the financing. She contributes her effort and absorbs part of the firm's business risk. The difference between her salary and her outside compensation is an opportunity cost. Specialization of her human capital to the new firm also creates an opportunity cost if the firm fails.
The entrepreneur receives shares or options in exchange for these investments. These shares may not vest immediately, 2 and they are illiquid unless and until the firm is sold or goes public. The venture capitalist frequently requires the entrepreneur to sign a contract that precludes work for a competitor. The entrepreneur therefore has a strong incentive to stick with the firm and make it successful.
Staged investment and financing.
A startup is a compound call option. Financing and investment are made in stages. The stages match up with business milestones, such as a demonstration of technology or a successful product introduction.
The entrepreneur and venture capitalist cannot write a complete contract to specify the terms of future financing. The terms are determined by bargaining as financing is raised stage by stage. If additional private investors join in later stages, the bargain has to be acceptable to them as well as the entrepreneur and initial venture capitalist.
Venture capital investors usually buy convertible preferred shares. If the firm is shut down, the investors have a senior claim on any remaining assets. The shares convert to common if the firm is sold or taken public. the board of directors. But Kaplan and Stromberg also find that venture capitalists' control increases when the firm's progress is unsatisfactory.
Staged financing can give incumbent venture capitalists effective control over access to financing. Their refusal to participate in the second or later rounds of financing would send a strong negative signal to other potential investors and deter them from investing. In practice, the incumbents' decision not to participate is a decision to shut down the firm. 4 Giving venture capitalists veto power over the later-stage financing is in some respects efficient. The shutdown decision cannot be left to the entrepreneur, who would be happy to continue investing someone else's money as long as there is any chance of success. 5 The venture capitalist is better equipped to decide whether to exercise the next stage of the compound call.
Thus staged financing has a double benefit, at least for the venture capitalist. It blocks the entrepreneur's incentive to continue investing and it allows the venture capitalist to exploit the startup's real option value. But it is also costly if the venture capitalist can use the threat of shutdown to negotiate terms for later-stage financing that dilute the entrepreneur's stake in the firm. Anticipated dilution feeds back into the entrepreneur's effort or willingness to participate, and reduces overall value.
Syndication of later-stage financing.
Later-stage financing usually comes from a syndicate of incumbent and new venture-capital investors. We show that the (implicit) commitment to syndicate is a way to assure the entrepreneur more favorable financing terms, in order to encourage her to exert more effort and to increase value.
Exit.
Entrepreneurs can rely on venture capitalists to "cash out" of successful startups. Venture capital generally comes from limited-life partnerships; the partners are not paid until the startups it invests in are sold or taken public. 6 
Preview of the model.
Our model captures these features. For simplicity we assume two stages only. Investment occurs at the time of the start-up and one period later (dates 0 and 1). 7 If successful, the firm is taken public at date 2, and the entrepreneur and venture capitalist cash out. Their 4 In this respect, a monopolist venture capitalist is similar to the monopoly lender in Rajan (1992) . 5 The entrepreneur can continue without expending effort. Of course she could quit if a better opportunity arises, one that is not precluded by non-compete clauses and is good enough to compensate for the loss of non-vested shares.
6 Myers (2000) shows that venture capitalists would go public voluntarily in order to avoid the adverse incentives of long-term private ownership. 7 It is for simplification reasons that we assume financing in two stages. Alternatively, new stages can be defined by the project reaching certain milestones. It is straightforward to show that staged-financing is optimal in our model because staged-financing enables the venture capitalist to shut down a project that fails to live up to expectations. Staged financing dominates the alternative of giving the entrepreneur all the money at the same time.
final payoffs are uncertain, because the potential value of the firm is not revealed until date 2.
Full realization of potential value requires maximum effort from the entrepreneur at dates 0 and 1. The entrepreneur's actual effort is always less than the maximum because effort is somewhat costly. Her optimal effort depends on her expected share of the value of the firm at date 2. The venture capitalist and the entrepreneur negotiate ownership percentages at date 0, but these percentages can change at date 1 if additional financing is raised and invested.
We assume that the firm cannot start or continue without the entrepreneur. If financing cannot be arranged on terms that satisfy her participation constraints for dates 0 and 1, no investment is made and the firm is shut down. The venture capitalist also has participation constraints at dates 0 and 1. He will not invest or continue if his NPV is negative. We solve the model under different assumptions about financing. The three cases are as follows. In the "first-best" case, the entrepreneur can finance the startup out of her own pocket, and overall value is maximized, net of the costs of effort. In the "monopoly" case, the initial venture capitalist supplies all financing at dates 0 and 1 and can dictate the terms of that financing. In the case of "later-stage syndication", additional private investors join the financing at date 1 at competitive terms. We show that a commitment to syndicate laterstage investments will make the financing terms better for the entrepreneur, which increases her effort and overall NPV.
The financing terms in the syndicate case depend on the information available to members of the syndicate. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario we assume that new investors have the same information as the incumbent venture capitalist. In the second scenario we assume that the incumbent has inside information, and analyze the conditions under which truthful information revelation takes place.
The numerical results of course depend on input assumptions. These assumptions are stated in Section 2. We vary the expected value and variance of the firm's potential value over plausible ranges, relative to the investment required. We also vary the costs and value added of the entrepreneur's effort.
Preview of results.
We solve the model over the input ranges and review the numerical results with several questions in mind. How efficient is venture capital financing? How much value is lost relative to first-best? How many startups with positive first-best NPVs cannot be financed? Is venture-capital financing generally more efficient for high-variance firms? Are there significant efficiency gains if new investors participate in second-round financing? Our most important results are as follows.
1. Relative to the first-best, we find significant value losses in all cases considered. Monopoly financing is significantly less efficient than syndicate financing.
2. There is a severe under-investment problem, i.e. many startups with positive NPV projects cannot be financed.
3. For projects that can be financed, there can be large value losses due to under-provision of effort, even for relatively small effort costs.
4.
A commitment to syndicate financing in later stages reduces the entrepreneur's underprovision of effort, increasing overall efficiency. Syndication increases the NPVs of both the entrepreneur and the initial venture capitalist. The venture capitalist's profits increase despite taking a smaller share than in the monopoly case. This result holds for a wide range of parameter values.
5. Syndicate financing is most effective when the incumbent venture capitalist's inside information is revealed through his participation in financing. However, truthful information revelation is not always attainable in our model. The "fixed-fraction" participation rule derived by Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) does not work as a revelation mechanism in our model, because in our model the terms of financing have a direct effect on the entrepreneur's effort. For this reason in our setting the fixed-fraction rule would induce the venture capitalist to over-report the value of the company: the higher the price paid by new investors, the more the entrepreneur's existing shares are worth, and the harder she works. However, a participation rule where the incumbent investor's fractional participation increases as the reported value increases can result in information revelation by the venture capitalist in certain cases.
We recognize that we have left out several aspects of venture capital that could influence our results. First, we ignore personal risk aversion. The venture capitalist and entrepreneur are assumed risk-neutral. This is reasonable for venture capitalists, who have access to financial markets. 8 It is less reasonable for entrepreneurs, who can't hedge or diversify payoffs without destroying incentives. 9 Second, we ignore the costs and value added of the venture capitalist's effort. We are in effect treating his effort as a cost sunk at startup and fixed afterwards. If his effort is variable, important and costly, another effort-feedback loop should be modeled. We leave this to another paper.
Third, we assume that final payoffs depend only on the number of shares bargained for at dates 0 and 1. We do not directly model the more complex, contingent contracts observed by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) that award shares to the entrepreneur at date 1 based on verifiable contingencies rather than bargaining. However, our results in Section 4 suggest that such contracts may be very effective to facilitate truthful revelation of private information by the initial venture capitalist to uninformed investors at later stages of financing.
Finally, we do not model the search and screening processes that bring the entrepreneur and venture capitalist together. The costs and effectiveness of these processes could affect the terms of financing. For example, if an entrepreneur's search for an alternative venture capitalist would be cheap and quick, the current venture capitalist's bargaining power is 8 Of course the venture capitalist will seek an expected rate of return high enough to cover the market risks of the startup. The payoffs in our model can be interpreted as market-value certainty equivalents. 9 Perhaps the entrepreneur's risk aversion is cancelled out by optimism. See Landier and Thesmar (2003) .
reduced. 10 Giving the entrepreneur the option to search for another venture capital investor would not change the structure of our model, however. It would simply tighten the entrepreneur's participation constraint at date 0.
Prior theory.
We have already mentioned several leading examples of institutional and empirical research and some theoretical models on venture capital financing of entrepreneurs. Here we briefly survey important related theoretical works not mentioned above. We group these papers by the agency problem or contractual feature they study in the entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationship.
Staged financing.
In Bergemann and Hege (1998) and Noldeke and Schmidt (1998) , staged financing allows the venture capitalist to gradually learn the project value and thereby induce the entrepreneur to continue to work harder. In Neher (1996) and Landier (2002) , the ability to deny financing at each stage provides the venture capitalist with the means to induce the entrepreneur to exert higher effort and to not divert the cash flows.
Control and exit provisions.
Venture capital contracts give the residual right to control to the venture investor. The venture capitalist's right to decide on the investment (Aghion and Bolton (1989) ) and the venture capitalist's right to replace the entrepreneur (Fluck (1998) , Hellman (1998), Myers (2000) , Fluck (2001) ) play an important role in enforcing financial contracts between venture investors and start-up managers. The entrepreneur's option to reacquire control and realize value in an initial public offering explains the success of venture capitalists to incentivizing entrepreneurs in models of Black and Gilson (1998), Myers (2000) and Aghion, Bolton and Tirole (2001).
Syndication.
Syndication of venture capital investments has been rationalized in several ways in previous theories. Wilson (1986) attributes syndication to venture capitalists' risk aversion. It may also help to aggregate the different information and expertise of the several venture capital investors.
11 Syndication may also reflect tacit collusion: early investors syndicate later rounds of financing, and the syndication partners return the favor when they develop promising startups (Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) ). We offer a different rationale. Competition to join a syndicate can protect the entrepreneur from dilution, alleviate the problems of ex post holdup and ex ante effort provision. 10 Inderst and Muller (2003) present a model of costly search and screening, with bargaining and endogenous effort by both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. The model does not consider staged investment and financing.
11 See Sah and Stiglitz (1986) . But aggregation of information should be most valuable in early, rather than later stage investment. In fact the number of venture capital investors expands in later stages.
Multiple contractual provisions.
Finally, Chelma, Habib and Lyngquist (2002) consider how the various provisions of venturecapital contracts are designed to mitigate multiple agency and information problems. Unlike our paper, theirs review the provisions one by one. They focus on different contractual provisions and they do not consider syndication.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of the paper sets up our model and solves the first-best case. Sections 3 and 4 cover the monopoly and syndication cases. Numerical results are summarized and interpreted in section 5. The concluding section 6 sums up our conclusions and the open questions remaining for further research.
2 The basic model and its first-best solution.
Set-up.
The entrepreneur possesses a startup investment opportunity that requires fixed investments I 0 + I 1 between time 0 and time 2. The investment can be made in one chunk 12 , or in two stages I 0 and I 1 at dates 0 and 1. If both investments are made, the startup continues to date 2 and the entrepreneur and the venture capital investors can split the final value of the firm. The split depends on their ownership percentages, which are assumed fixed after financing has been raised at date 1.
If the investment at date 1 is not made, or if the entrepreneur refuses to participate, the startup is shut down and liquidated. We assume for simplicity that liquidation value is zero. (In practice it is typically small for high-tech start-ups.) This assumption simplifies our analysis of financing, because the preferred shares held by the venture capitalist have value only if converted. Thus, we can treat these shares as if they were common in the first place.
The total payoff at date 2 is P. P is stochastic and depends on the entrepreneur's effort at time 0 and time 1, x 0 and x 1 . Effort affects the value of the firm multiplicatively through the effort functions f 0 (x 0 ) and f 1 (x 1 ):
is an integral that accounts for the dependence of f 1 on V 1 .
We assume risk-neutrality and a risk-free interest rate of zero. Therefore V 1 and V 2 can be interpreted as potential market values at dates 1 and 2. We will use lognormal probability distributions for V 1 and V 2 , with a variance of σ 2 per period.
Effort Functions.
We define
The effort function f asymptotes to 1, so we interpret V 1 and V 2 as maximum attainable values as x → ∞. The degree of convexity and concavity of g and f depend on θ g and θ f , respectively. The effort functions are plotted in Figure 1 for different values of θ f and θ g .
Ownership.
The entrepreneur approaches the initial venture capitalist to raise startup financing. The ownership shares of the entrepreneur and the initial venture capitalist at date 0 are denoted by α 
First-Best
In the first-best case, the entrepreneur supplies all of the money (α 
The entrepreneur has a real compound call option. The exercise price at date 1 is endogenous, however, because it includes the cost of effort, and effort depends on the realized potential value f 0 V 1 . Since we use the lognormal, our solutions will resemble the BlackScholes formula, with extra terms capturing the cost of effort.
Effort and exercise at date 1.
By date 1, the entrepreneur's date-0 effort is sunk. Her NP V at date 1 is
The first-order condition for effort is
, and
where
where e θ = θ
can be computed from
We will refer to V 1 as a "strike value". It is similar to a strike price: when
1 > 0 and the entrepreneur exercises the option. However, the price of exercise is not
Effort and exercise at date 0.
At date 0, the entrepreneur must determine the effort x 0 that maximizes NP V 0 , the difference between the expected NP V at date 1 and the t=0 costs of investment and effort.
NP V
depends on x 0 in two ways: (1) Increasing effort at t = 0 decreases the threshold for investment at t = 1 (makes it more likely the option is in the money) and (2) increases the value of the project when it is in the money.
This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 2 . The topmost line is the date 1 NPV that would prevail for a typical stock option with no effort cost. The firm's value is V 1 and the strike price is I 1 . The lower lines are the actual NPVs when the entrepreneur exerts less than the maximum effort at date 0 (f 0 < 1). NP V 1 is close to linear in V 1 , with both the slope and the absolute level reduced. The middle line represents a higher x 0 choice which increases the value of the project at date 1. We have superimposed a lognormal distribution around V 0 to show the probability weights assigned to these date 1 NPVs. The two horizontal lines are the date 0 costs I 0 + g 0 of proceeding with investment. Again, the higher line results from a higher x 0 choice.
where Π(V ) is the lognormal density.
We solve for x 0 analytically, using properties of the lognormal distribution. Details are in the Appendix. Then we evaluate NP V
0 (x 0 ) > 0, investment will be made and the firm is up and running. Table 1 presents examples of our numerical results. We assume a potential value of V 0 = E 0 (V 2 ) = 150, and required investment of 100, with I 1 , I 2 = 50, 50 or 10, 90. We also assume that θ f = 1.8 and θ g = 0.6, so the value added by effort is high relative to the cost. Thus the option to invest in the startup should be well in the money, even after the costs of effort are deducted.
At this point we will refer only to the first two lines of each panel of the table, which report Black-Scholes and first-best results. If the costs of effort were zero, first-best NPV could be calculated from the Black-Scholes formula, with an exercise price of V = 50 at date 1. V increases, however, when the cost of effort is introduced, and NPV declines. We can compare the results for the first and second lines of Panel A of Table 1 , which assumes a standard deviation of σ = 0.4 per period. First-best NPV is 37.90, less than the BlackScholes NPV by 12.13. The difference reflects the cost of effort and the increase in exercise price from 50 to V = 55.35.
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Panel B repeats the example with higher standard deviation of σ = 0.8. Panels C and D assume lower investment at date 0 and higher investment at date 1. NPV increases for higher standard deviations and when more investment can be deferred. Initial effort decreases in these cases, though not dramatically.
Monopoly financing by a single venture capitalist
Now we assume the entrepreneur has no money and must raise all financing from a single venture capitalist at both dates 0 and 1. This monopoly case provides a useful benchmark. 14 We assume that the venture capitalist is an insider. He can observe V 0 and V 1 and infer the entrepreneur's effort. This assumption is plausible because of the small scale of most start-ups and the intensive screening and monitoring that venture capitalists undertake. We also give the venture capitalist all the bargaining power over terms of financing, consistent with his monopoly status. The venture capitalist will not want to exploit all that bargaining power, however, because of the feedback to the entrepreneur's effort.
"Terms of financing" means the number of common shares held by the entrepreneur and venture capitalist at dates 0 and 1. We do not consider contracts where shares can be awarded contingent upon effort or realized value. Thus we are operating in a simpler world than Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) , who find many examples of share awards contingent upon entrepreneurs meeting performance targets (although not upon effort or value). These contingent awards are presumably designed to mitigate the inefficiencies revealed in our results.
We do assume, however, that the entrepreneur has clear property rights to her shares at time 2, and that these shares cannot be taken away or diluted between dates 1 and 2. The division of the final payoff P is enforcable.
The entrepreneur's final share of the company is the complement of α C 1 , the venture capitalist's share at date 1. The entrepreneur's share at date 0 are irrelevant, because the venture capitalist can force the terms of financing at date 1, and is free to dilute shares awarded earlier. Thus the interactions between financing, effort, and value are more evident at date 1 than at date 0.
Effort and investment at date 1.
Both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist now have the option to participate at date 1. There are two derivative claims on one underlying asset. Both must be exercised in order for the firm to continue.
At date 1 the entrepreneur decides whether to exercise her option, based on her strike cost g 1 (x 1 ). But first the venture capitalist sets α C 1 and decides whether he wants to exercise his option, based on his strike cost I 1 . We can focus solely on the decision-making of the venture capitalist if we incorporate the entrepreneur's exercise decision into the venture capitalist's. That is, when the venture capitalist chooses α C 1 , he operates subject to the constraint that the entrepreneur wishes to exercise, i.e. that NP V
The equations for the entrepreneur's effort and NPV are similar to Eqs. (4)-(6), except that the second-period investment I 1 drops out, and firm value is multiplied by the entrepreneur's share α
¢¸( 8)
The maximum share the venture capitalist can take is obtained by setting the last term in (10) equal to zero. This yields
, the entrepreneur will not continue the project. 15 The venture capitalist chooses α C 1 to maximize his date 1 NPV, subject to the entrepreneur's participation constraint. 16 
NP V
The (unconstrained) first-order condition is:
¤ , the venture capitalist chooses the unconstrained value; if not, he assigns α C 1 (max). 17 However, most parameterizations ensure that the constraint never binds, that is, V 1 C , the venture capitalist's strike value for the monopoly case, will fall in the region where the constraint is slack. In this case, the entrepreneur enjoys positive NPV. The venture capitalist is typically better off by taking a share α 
Investment occurs if
3.2 Effort and exercise at date 0.
In the first-best case, the entrepreneur anticipates x 1 and I 1 in her choice of x 0 . In the second-best case of the monopolist venture capitalist, the entrepreneur makes her effort 15 α M 1 (min) may be greater than 1 if f 0 is small or the V 1 realization is low. Liquidation would ensue. 16 Note that in NP V C 1 we assume that the venture capitalist's outside option is 0. If the venture capitalist's alternative is to seed-finance a start-up, then his outside option would be E 0 (NP V C 0 ) instead. While the latter formulation would be computationally much more demanding, it would not alter our results in any significant way. It would, however, translate into a somewhat higher threshold for the stage-1 refinancing, and more frequent shut-downs. 17 This follows because NP V
decision anticipating the venture capitalist's choice of α C 1 (x 0 ). This term decreases her share of P and decreases P by reducing x 1 . The venture capitalist evaluates whether NP V C 0 (x 0 ) ≥ 0. As in the first-best case, higher effort at t = 0 lowers the threshold for investment at t = 1 (makes it more likely that both player's options are in the money) and increases the value of the project when the option is in the money.
The entrepreneur's date 0 value is
Here there is no closed-form expression for α C * 1 or the manager's first-order condition. We solve the first-order condition and determine x * 0 numerically. Given x * 0 , and assuming that the entrepreneur wants to continue, i.e. NP V M 0 (x * 0 ) > 0, the venture capitalist decides whether to invest. His option is worth:
If NP V C 0 > 0 the venture capitalist will provide funding. Thus two options must be exercised at date 0 in order to launch the startup. The entrepreneur picks x * 0 to maximize the value of her option to continue at date 1, and then determines whether this value exceeds her current strike price, the immediate cost of effort g * 0 . The venture capitalist values his option to invest I 1 at date 1, taking the entrepreneur's immediate and future effort into account, and then decides whether to invest at date 0.
Monopoly financing is extremely inefficient. The venture capitalist's ability to claim a large ownership fraction at date 1 reduces the entrepreneur's effort at date 0 as well as date 1, reducing value and increasing the venture capitalist's breakeven point V Table 1 , the entrepreneur's initial effort falls by about 50% from first-best level, and the date-1 strike value V C 1 increases by about 25%. The entrepreneur's NPV drops by more than 90 percent. The drop in overall NPV is more than half in Panel A, somewhat less in the other panels.
Syndicate financing: The case of full information
The inefficiency of the monopoly case would be reduced if the entrepreneur could promise higher effort at date 1, or if the venture capitalist could promise to take a lower ownership fraction α C * 1 . Neither promise is credible, however, since effort and potential value are noncontractible. But suppose that the venture capitalist can commit to raise date-1 financing from a syndicate of new investors and that the terms of syndicate financing are competitive, i.e., zero-NPV for the syndicate. We show that such syndicate financing will induce more effort by the entrepreneur and will generate higher value.
In practice later-stage financing is usually provided by a syndicate of new and existing investors. The incumbent investor approaches a group of other venture capitalists that he has worked with in the past, or hopes to work with in the future, and offers participation in the financing. We do not know what NPV syndicates obtain in practice, but it is useful to explore the NPV = 0 case as a limiting case.
We start with the full-information case, where outside investors who compete to join the date 1 syndicate have full information, i.e., the same information as the incumbent venture capitalist. The results for this competitive case differ from the monopoly case. First, the terms of financing shift in the entrepreneur's favor. The syndicate's ownership share α S 1 will generate NPV = 0, rather than the NPV-maximizing share α C * 1 set when the incumbent acts as a monopolist. The entrepreneur suffers less dilution, exerts more effort, and everyone's value increases. 18 Second, ownership percentages at date 0 matter. The initial venture capitalist has no control over the terms of financing at date 1, so his ultimate ownership and payoff are determined by his initial share α C 0 . This pushes the exercise of his monopoly power back to date 0. He can only exercise monopoly power at date 0.
Third, the initial venture capitalist will always want the investment to proceed at date 1 assuming that the project can return the investment. 19 This is so because the initial venture capitalist does not put up any money (or if he does invest through the syndicate, the investment is zero-NPV). Hence he effectively owns a call option with a zero exercise price.
Effort and investment at date 1.
At date 1, for a given share α M 1 , the entrepreneur's NPV and maximization problem are the same as before. We obtain x 1 , f 1 , g 1 , and NP V 
Substituting in (18) for P we get
Investment at date 1 occurs for V 1 > V S 1 . We solve for V S 1 using the same procedure as in the monopolistic venture capitalist case. We identify V S 1 by finding the point at which the hypothetical profit-maximizing value of α S 1 and the value of α S 1 implied by the zero-NPV condition in Eq. (19) intersect. At this point the maximum value to the syndicate is zero. 18 This would hold even if the syndicate receives positive NPV. 19 This is no longer true if the syndicate participates at positive NPV. 20 In general there will be two solutions to this equation, α We find that V S 1 is higher in this case than V C 1 , the strike value for the monopoly case. The increase in the strike value can be traced to the initial venture capitalist's ownership share.
The syndicate cannot optimally reset α C 0 . When the original venture capitalist provides both rounds of financing, he overrides his original share and picks the share which is best for him at date 1. That is, for certain low realizations of V 1 the monopolist venture capitalist would find it optimal to reduce his share to further incentivize the entrepreneur. The syndicate cannot do this. It is faced with a free-riding venture capitalist. The syndicate has a smaller chunk of the pie to carve up, resulting in a higher threshold for investment (for the same x 0 choice). However, as it is shown in the next subsection, the use of a stage-2 syndicate will provide better incentives for the entrepreneur and will produce a larger overall pie.
The commitment to syndicate later-stage financing has two counterveiling effects on the underinvestment problem. On the one hand, the syndicate requires a higher threshold for investment, so marginal projects will be rejected more often. As a result, the underinvestment problem becomes more severe. On the other hand, syndication provides better incentives for the entrepreneur so low values of f 0 V 1 will be less likely. This way, syndication alleviates the effort-provision problem and thereby reduces underinvestment. As it is shown in the next subsection, the second effect outweighs the first effect, so stage-2 syndication will achieve an overall reduction in underinvestment.
Effort and exercise at date 0.
At date 0, the venture capitalist decides α C 0 , the share to demand and the entrepreneur decides how much effort to exert. For a given α C 0 , the entrepreneur's value is
Using the solutions for f 1 , g 1 , and α S 1 from Eqs. (9) and (19), we get
The entrepreneur takes into account α S 1 , her future dilution, as with α C 1 in Section 3. For a given α C 0 syndicate financing will result in less dilution, so the entrepreneur is motivated to provide higher effort at t = 0 as well as at t = 1. We cannot solve for α S 1 in closed form, but we can compute α S 1 and the entrepreneur's effort numerically:
The venture capitalist anticipates the entrepreneur's reaction when he sets α C 0 . He must restrict his search to α
This constraint rarely binds, since at the margin there are always gains to be made by leaving positive value to the entrepreneur. Thus α C * 0 will be chosen as
Using f 1 , g 1 , α S 1 , and x 0 from (9), (19) , and (22) ,
If NP V C 0 ≥ 0 investment will proceed. Typical results for stage-2 syndicate financing are shown in the fourth rows of Panels A-D in Table 1 . Effort and value increase across the board, despite increases in the strike value V at date 1. Table 1 also shows numerical results for a case in which zero-NPV financing is provided at date 0 as well as date 1. 21 This case is the best attainable when the entrepreneur has no money and has to share the marginal value added of his effort with outside investors. Of course, such financing may not be available in practice.
Renegotiation
As we have noted, the strike value V 1 increases when a syndicate provides financing at date 1. The increase occurs because the syndicate cannot reset the incumbent venture capitalist's ownership share. (It has no incentive to reset it, when its NPV = 0). But the entrepreneur and incumbent venture capitalist could bargain at date 1 to reset their relative shares before raising syndicate financing. Suppose that V 1 falls less than V S 1 , the syndicate strike value. Both entrepreneur and incumbent might be better off renegotiating than shutting down entirely. In this region the incumbent would voluntarily transfer ownership to the entrepreneur, retaining α C 0 (R) < α C * 0 . By discarding enough of his shares, the incumbent improves effort 21 Solution procedures for the fully competitive case are identical to those just presented, except that α incentives for the entrepreneur to the point where he can turn to the syndicate for zero-NPV financing.
22 (Shares could be discarded in several ways. For example, the venture capitalist could provide bridge financing on terms favorable to the entrepreneur.) Such date-1 renegotiation seems beneficial ex-post, since it would improve effort and continuation decisions, increasing value. But the flexibility to reset shares at date 1 has detrimental effects at date 0 ex ante. The initial venture capitalist would set α C 0 at a very high level, knowing that he could write it down to the monopoly level at date 1. Thus the entrepreneur's "upside" at date 1 would be cut off, compared to the competitive case. 23 However, this would induce the entrepreneur to drastically cut back on effort at date 0, which would be costly for the venture capitalist. (This situation is effectively a return to monopoly pricing, which decreases the NPVs of both parties.)
Thus three conditions must hold in order for the competitive case to work as we have described it. First, the initial venture capitalist has to commit at date 0 to syndicate financing at date 1. In practice this is not an explicit, formal commitment, but syndication is standard operating procedure (Lerner (1994) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) ). Second, the terms of financing should be reasonably competitive. In practice they may not be perfectly competitive, but materially better for the entrepreneur than the terms in the monopoly case. Third, the initial venture capitalist has to limit its initial ownership share α C 0 to its level in the syndicate case, so that he cannot start with a higher value and bargain down to the monopoly share α C * 1 at date 1. Note that there are alternative ways to rephrase the third condition to achieve the same result without explicitly restricting the choice of α C 0 by the initial venture capitalist. For example, the same result can be achieved if (3a) the syndicate commits not to finance a project unless the terms of financing are unchanged prior to the syndicate financing stage. 22 Renegotiation will lead to the same strike value V 1 in the competitive case as in the monopoly case, given the same initial effort level. The argument is as follows. Suppose the venture capitalist sets his date-0 share at the fraction derived for the competitive case, and V 1 ends up $1 below the competitive V 1 derived above. The syndicate will not invest, because its NPV would be negative. But the incumbent gets nothing if the firm is shut down. He would be better off giving some extra shares to the entrepreneur, just enough to make the syndicate's NP V = 0. Then he could turn to the syndicate (as promised at date 0) for outside financing. So the effective V 1 ends up $1 lower.
The argument repeats for V 1 $2 below the competitive V 1 , $3 below, etc. but to what limit? The incumbent would always give shares to the entrepreneur as long as he gets positive NPV from continuing. The limit would be reached when NP V However, since syndication leads to greater initial effort provision, with renegotiation the strike value will actually be lower than V C 1 . We approximate renegotiation gains (holding α C * 0 and x 0 constant) by solving for 1) the point at which the venture capitalist first finds it optimal to reduce his share 2) the new strike value and 3) the integral of NP V changes over this range. Results presented in the results tables do not include renegotiation gains. 23 The entrepreneur could retain the upside if she could bypass the incumbent venture capitalist and go directly to the syndicate for financing. In practice the incumbent could block this end run by refusing to participate in the syndicate. The syndicate will assume that the incumbent has inside information, and will interpret the refusal to participate as bad news sufficient to deter investment. We discuss the effects of inside information below. (19) . Because a fully informed competitive syndicate receives zero-NPV anyway, the syndicate is indifferent to whether or not renegotiation occurs prior to the syndicate financing stage, hence both (3a) and (3b) are (weakly) incentive compatible for such a syndicate.
However, a less informed syndicate will be suspicious about any renegotiation between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist prior to the syndicate financing stage. When there is asymmetric information between the insiders and the syndicate about the value of the project, renegotiation can send a misleading signal to the syndicate about the value of the project. For example, a less than fully informed syndicate cannot tell whether a bridge loan was granted at favorable, fair, or unfavorable terms to the entrepreneur. If the syndicate thinks that the terms of the loan are fair, a loan with favorable terms would signal higher than the true value for the project and would induce the syndicate to make a negative NPV investment. Hence, an imperfectly informed or uninformed syndicate would strictly prefer that the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist freeze the terms of financing prior to the syndication stage.
Secondly, a less than fully-informed competitive syndicate also cares about the power of incentives at time 0. The lower the power of those incentives, the more likely that f 0 V 1 is close to f 0 V S 1 , the very region where the revelation mechanism frequently breaks down resulting in negative NPV for the syndicate. As we discussed above, when renegotiation is allowed, the power of incentives will be low, because the initial venture capitalist will be tempted to set α C 0 at a very high level knowing that he can write it down to the monopoly level at date 1. This can be prevented if the syndicate explicitly prohibits any change in the terms of financing prior to the syndicate financing stage. The syndicate would be strictly better off by doing so.
Competitive financing: The case of asymmetric information
So far we have assumed full information. This is reasonable for the incumbent venture capitalist, who is an insider. It is not always reasonable for a syndicate of new investors at date 1.
Both the incumbent and entrepreneur want the syndicate to perceive a high value V 1 . The more optimistic the syndicate, the lower the ownership share that has to be given up in exchange for the syndicate's investment. Reducing the syndicate's share increases the incumbent's and entrepreneur's shares, and thus increases the effort that the entrepreneur provides. Announcements of "great progress" or "high value" coming from the entrepreneur or incumbent venture capitalist will not be credible, however.
The incumbent investor may be able to make such reports credible by participating in the date 1 financing. Suppose the incumbent invests βI 1 and the outside syndicate the rest. What participation fraction β is consistent with truthful revelation of V 1 ?
Suppose we could hold the entrepreneur's effort constant. Then we could rely on Admati and Pfleiderer's (1994) proof that β should be fixed at the incumbent investor's ownership share at date 0, that is, α C 0 . This fixed-fraction rule would remove any incentive for the incumbent to over-report V 1 . (The more he over-reports, the more he has to overpay for his new shares. When β = α C 0 , the amount overpaid cancels out any gain in the value of his existing shares). 24 The fixed-fraction rule would also insure optimal investment decisions, since the incumbent's share of date-1 investment exactly equals his share of the final payoff V 2 . (Admati and Pfleiderer also show that no other financing rule or procedure is robust in their setting).
Fixed-fraction financing is not effective in our model, although a close approximation of fixed-fraction financing works in many cases. The problem is the effect of the terms of date-1 financing on the entrepreneur's effort. Suppose the incumbent investor buys a fraction β = α C 0 of date-1 financing, and then reports a valueV 1 that is slightly higher than the true value V 1 . If the report is credible, the new shares are over-priced. The incumbent does not gain or lose from the mispricing, because β = α C 0 , but the entrepreneur gains on his old shares at the syndicate's expense. Since the entrepreneur's ownership share is higher than it would be under a truthful report, she exerts more effort, firm value increases, and both the entrepreneur and incumbent investor are better off. Therefore the incumbent will over-report.
A share distribution rule that is close to the fixed-fraction rule can assure truthful revelation, however, provided that β is set above α C 0 and effort is not too sensitive to changes in the entrepreneur's NPV at date 1. The difference between β and α C 0 depends on the responsiveness of the entrepreneur's effort. In many cases, a constant β set a few percentage points above α C 0 gives truthful revelation (V 1 = V 1 ) over a wide range of V 1 realizations. But this rule seems to break down as a revelation mechanism in at least two ways.
First, we find situations where the required β exceeds 1, which would make sense only if the new syndicate investors were willing to short the company. Clearly we have to constrain β < 1. This constraint can bind in our numerical results, because the incumbent's initial share α C 0 is frequently above 0.85 or 0.90, and in some of these cases the entrepreneur's effort is very sensitive to the value of her stake in the firm. There is not much room for β to increase between these starting points and a maximum level strictly less than 1. These situations will also arise from very low V 1 realizations. When V 1 falls close to but less than V 1 , the incumbent's incentive to over-report becomes very strong, and only extremely high βs can discipline the incumbent to tell the truth. This problem flows from the discontinuity of the entrepreneur's effort at the strike value V 1 25 In these cases, an almost fixed-fraction rule cannot induce revelation.
A second problem arises at high levels of V 1 . Since β > α C 0 , the incumbent investor has an incentive to under-report V 1 . The incumbent would gain more from underpricing the new shares and buying them cheaply than he would lose from dilution of his existing stake. This incentive is only mitigated by the impact on the entrepreneur's effort. But as V 1 andV 1 increase, effort becomes higher and less sensitive to the terms of financing. As effort "tops out," the incentive to under-report takes over. This could be prevented locally by allowing β to decrease withV 1 , returning to β = α C 0 at very high values. This can be achieved by more complex contracts like granting the entrepreneur share awards contingent on V 1 , the type of contracts documented by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) .
When the almost-fixed fraction rule fails, the syndicate investors face the asymmetric information problem analyzed by Myers and Majluf (1984) . The firm has no assets in place and no value on liquidation, so it goes ahead with financing if its value exceeds the venture capitalist's outside option, but on terms fixed by the new investors' knowledge of V 0 and their understanding of the entrepreneur's effort functions 26 . The new issue will be overpriced when V 1 is low and underpriced when V 1 is high. This leads to more effort when V 1 is low and less when it is high, compared to the full-information case, and thus greater inefficiency.
Even if the revelation machanism fails, there may be other ways to convey V 1 . The value of the incumbent investor's reputation could generate truthful reports in a repeated game setting, for example. The syndicate usually includes other venture capitalists that the incumbent has worked with in the past and expects to work with in the future.
Results and Conclusions

Summary of numerical results
Some of our most important numerical results were previewed in Table 1 . We found surprisingly large value losses relative to first-best despite the low cost of effort assumed. The losses can be traced to the venture capitalist's bargaining power over the terms of financing and to reduced incentives for effort by the entrepreneur.
Value losses are greatest in the monopoly case where the initial venture capitalist provides all financing and can dictate the terms of financing at date 1 as well as date 0. This does not mean that the venture capitalist extracts all value, leaving the entrepreneur with zero NPV. The venture capitalist wants to preserve the entrepreneur's incentives to some extent. Nevertheless, the financing terms that maximize value for the venture capitalist usually leave the entrepreneur with small minority slice of a diminished pie.
Large value losses are encountered even for small values of the parameters θ f and θ g . Table 2 repeats Table 1 , but with θ f = 0.6 vs. 1.8 in Table 1 . That is, the ratio Figure  1 is triple the ratio in Figure 2 . The entrepreneur's ownership share increases in Table 2 , but strike values are higher and NPVs are much lower, in fact negative in Panels A, B and C, even for the competitive case. Negative NPVs are marked with asterisks. Of course, a negative NPV for either the entrepreneur or venture capitalist means that the startup will not be financed. NPVs are positive only in Panel D, where standard deviation increases to 0.8 and only 10 percent of investment is put up at date 0.
Introducing new investors and competition to date-1 financing always makes both the entrepreneur and the initial venture capitalist better off. This key result of our paper is evident in Tables 1 and 2 and also holds generally. A commitment to syndication and competition assures the entrepreneur of a final ownership share that is more or less dilution proof. This result does not depend on perfect competition and date-1 financing at exactly zero-NPV. Any degree of competition is better than the power exercised when the incumbent venture capitalist can monopolize the supply of new money.
We believe this competitive case, in which the initial venture capitalist can set financing terms at date 0 but not date 1, is more realistic and relevant than the monopoly case. The competitive case is a much better match to actual venture capital investment because it incorporates the syndication of later-stage financing. Our competitive results also predict that the entrepreneur's final ownership share is an increasing function of firm value, consistent with Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) . The monopoly results say that the ownership share is a decreasing function of value, which is not observed in practice.
There are still value losses in the competitive case because of the venture capitalist's ability to set financing terms at date 0. In fact there are value losses even in the completely competitive case where all financing is provided at NPV = 0. The entrepreneur's effort falls whenever outside financing has to be raised. This is because the entrepreneur bears the full cost of effort, but has to share the marginal value added by effort with the outside investors. Compare the NPVs for the first-best and fully competitive cases in Tables 1 and 2 . In Panel A of Table 1 , for example, the manager's first-best NPV is 37.90. The highest attainable NPV with outside funding, shown on the "Competitive, dates 0,1" row of the table, is 35.38.
The effects of other parameters on the results in Tables 1 and 2 are generally as we expected. NPV increases when the ratio θ f θ g increases. The strike value V falls, increasing the probability that the date-1 option to invest is in the money, and when the option is in the money it is worth more.
Increasing either θ f or θ g reduces effort because the net marginal value added by effort declines. Overall NPV increases when σ increases (generating more uncertainty in V 1 and V 2 ) and when a greater fraction of investment can be deferred to date 1. These effects are natural for investments in real options.
We have calculated value losses for the various cases for a wide range of effort parameters θ f and θ g . Due to the exponential form of the effort functions, strike values and NPVs depend only on the ratio
. Figures 5 and 6 therefore plot value losses vs. that ratio. The losses in NPV are expressed as a fraction of the total required investment of 100. Potential value V 0 is 200. Figure 5 assumes evenly distributed investment, with I 0 , I 1 = 50, 50. Figure  6 assumes that most investment can be deferred (I 0 , I 1 = 10, 90).
As expected, the value losses are always greater in the monopoly than in the competitive case. The losses in the competitive case still appear economically significant, however. The only situations in which losses do not appear significant occur in the completely competitive case (financing at NPV = 0 at date 0 as well as 1) when θ f θ g is about 1 or higher. High values for θ f θ g mean that effort generates value at relatively little cost, so that the entrepreneur is willing to expend effort, even though the marginal benefit of effort is shared with outside investors.
Value losses increase rapidly with
is less than 1. This does not mean that very low values of θ f θ g are value-enhancing. In this region NPV is increasing rapidly; the value loss is taken from a rapidly increasing base.
Value losses increase as standard deviation is increased from σ = 0.4 to 0.8, at least for the region where θ f θ g is about 1.0 and higher. We found this surprising. Our original intuition was that increased uncertainty would enhance the optionality of investment and mitigate incentive problems. Instead it makes these problems worse, because more uncertainty leads to lower effort. This effect can also be seen in Tables 1 and 2 , particularly in panels C and D.
When overall NPV is near zero, the entrepreneur's effort x 0 increases rapidly with σ. The more uncertainty, the greater chance that the entrepreneur's call option will be in the money and the greater the marginal reward to effort. But as θ f θ g increases and NPV rises, effort eventually declines as σ increases, because the marginal impact of effort is less. The difference can be traced to the slope of the cumulative lognormal, which is lower at the mean when σ is high.
The negative feedback of uncertainty to effort is less pronounced in Figure 5 than in Figure  6 , where most investment is deferred to date 1. It is more pronounced in the competitive cases than in the monopoly case, particularly in Figure 5 .
Conclusions
As far as we know, this paper is the first attempt to combine the most prominent features of venture-capital contracting in a consistent formal model. As we expected, the model has no closed-form solution, except in the first-best case, so we embarked on an experiment in computational corporate finance. We close with a few comments on the more intriguing general results of the experiment.
The startups that venture capitalists invest in are compound call options. Therefore we expected strong option-like behavior, for example a strong dependence of strike values and NPVs on the variance of final payoffs. But this expected behavior was attenuated or overridden by agency and incentive problems. We just noted how increased uncertainty dampens the entrepreneur's effort, for example. This feedback is not a result of risk aversion, because the entrepreneur is assumed risk-neutral. It arises because increased uncertainty reduces the marginal value added by effort when potential value is sufficiently high.
The option-like properties of venture capital investments are also attenuated because financing is feasible only for startups that are well in the money, from a purely financial point of view. They have to be well in the money to overcome incentive problems and costs of effort. That is why all the numerical results presented in this paper assume expected potential value of V 0 = 150 or 200, vs. total investment of only 100. Even with these prospects, financing may not be feasible, even in the competitive case. Note the negative NPVs in panels A, B and C of Table 2 , for example.
We were surprised by the magnitude of value losses from first-best, even in the competitive case with outside financing at NPV = 0 at date 1. The losses appear economically significant. That does not mean that venture capital could reach first-best in practice, however. There may be no way to overcome agency and incentive problems completely. Of course some of the gap between our results and first-best may be closed in practice by more complex contracts, for example the contingent share awards observed by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) .
Of course numerical results are never conclusive. One can never rule out the possibility that results would have been different with different inputs or modeling choices. But we verified our results over a wide range of inputs. Our model, though simplified, follows actual practice in venture capital. Once we simplified, our only judgment call in modeling was the choice of exponential functions for the value added and cost of effort. We believe these functions are reasonable.
Our model could be expanded to include more realistic features of venture capital investment. The inclusion of contingent share awards would be particularly interesting. But we doubt that adding other features would change our general results. For example, it seems unlikely that including risk aversion for the entrepreneur or effort by the venture capitalist would mitigate the agency and incentive problems that drive our main results. We take the expectation of the entrepreneur's date 1 NPV by integrating the expression
from V 1 onwards
The expression for E 0 (NP V M 1 (x 0 )) 0 is as given in the text,
Change of variables on the lognormal establishes that
where µ = E(ln V ), σ 2 = V ar(ln V ), and N (0,1) is the standard normal cdf. Using this property on the entrepreneur's first-order condition yields
We solve analytically for x 0 since ϕ = ϕ(V 1 (x 0 )).
Solving the monopolistic case.
Both the entrepreneur and venture capitalist must have NP V 1 > 0 to proceed at date 1. To find V 1 we must ascertain which player hits his participation contraint first. For large V 1 , α C 1 grows more slowly than α C 1 (max), so it is for small V 1 (which result from small I 1 ) that the constraint may bind. For realistic parameterizations, it is the the venture capitalist's value which determines V 1 while the entrepreneur enjoys positive NP V everywhere past (and including) V 1 . That is, V 1 occurs in the region where the entrepreneur's participation constraint is slack. This can be comprehended either as the result of the additive investment cost function or as the result of incentives. Mathematically, I 1 does not affect F OC C 1 , so by altering I 1 one can alter the venture capitalist's profitability without changing the optimal α C 1 (and thus the entrepreneur's profitability). Intuitively, usually α C 1 (max) is so high that the venture capitalist can do better by taking a smaller share and giving the entrepreneur higher incentive to work. Except for very minute levels of I 1 , we are in the region where the entrepreneur's participation constraint is slack. In this case, we solve for V 1 by looking for the pair
where from Eq. (13)
Solving this system of equations
after solving for α C 1 (V 1 ) numerically from
With V 1 in hand, we can solve for x 0 . We start with the entrepreneur's first-order condition (Eq. 16)
Since the entrepreneur enjoys positive profits at V 1 , we cannot avoid the middle term in this equation. Using Eq. (10) and α
from Eq. (13) we obtain
To take (NP V M 1 (x 0 )) 0 , we will also need the formula for ∂α
1 . Using the implicit function theorem on Eq. (13) yields
With this we can derive the left-hand side term in Eq. (35) . Differentiation of Eq. (36) and substitution of Eq. (37) we obtain
The middle term in Eq. (35) is evaluated as follows.
) from Eq.s (33) and (34) 
These elements allow us to solve for x 0 from Eq. (35), albeit not in closed form. When we solve numerically for x 0 we evaluate the integrals point-by-point, ending the summation at 3 standard deviations of V 1 .
Solving the competitive case.
We solve for V 1 using the same procedure as was used in the monopolistic venture capitalist scenario. As previously, it may be that V 1 occurs where NP V Again, for realistic values of I 1 we are in the region where the entrepreneur's participation constraint is slack. Since in this region the entrepreneur makes positive profits, we identify V 1 by finding the point where the maximum value to the syndicate is zero. This point occurs when the value of α S 1 implied by the syndicate's zero-profit condition is equal to that implied by his hypothetical maximization problem. The syndicate's zero-profit condition (Eq. 19 ) and his F OC S 1 are as follows:
We solve for V 1 by finding the pair
Using F OC S 1 Eq. (42) once again, we compute V 1 as
These two expressions are nearly identical to Eq.s (33) and (34), pertaining to the monopolistic venture capitalist's breakeven point. The sole difference in the expressions is the presence of α Consider a project where there is no date 1 effort, only the I 1 cost. In expectation the project is worth (letting f 0 = 1 for simplicity) P= V 1 − I 1 . The original venture capitalist's exposure is
If the truth is reported in equilibrium, then
To make the capitalist indifferent to V 1 reports, take the derivative of Eq. (45) with respect to b V 1 . Setting equal to zero yields
or, using c α
The only solution which equalizes this expression is β = α C 0 . A similar derivation can be done when I 1 can vary, (for instance if we consider I 1 to influence the probability of favorable V 2 realizations) the key component is that the participating insider shares in all project costs. 
and
When we differentiate by b V 1 , we obtain
or
Enforcing b V 1 = V 1 and using α S 1 f 1 V 1 = I 1 ,this reduces to
that is
First we note that if the effort did not change with V 1 , the right-hand side would equal zero requiring again that α
The gap between α and effort is x 0 . V is the minimum value necessary for investment at date 1. NPV is the net present value at date 0, overall and for the entrepreneur (M) and initial investor (C). Potential value is V 0 = E 0 (V 2 ) = 150. I 0 and I 1 denote fixed investment costs, and σ is standard deviation per period of V t . Effort parameters are θ f = 1.8 (valued added) and θ g = 0.6 (cost).
A. I 0 = 50, I 1 = 50, σ = 0.4 and effort is x 0 . V is the minimum value necessary for investment at date 1. NPV is the net present value at date 0, overall and for the entrepreneur (M) and initial investor (C). Potential value is V 0 = E 0 (V 2 ) = 150. I 0 and I 1 denote fixed investment costs, and σ is standard deviation per period of V t . Effort parameters are θ f = 0.6 (valued added) and θ g = 0.6 (cost).
A. I 0 = 50, I 1 = 50, σ = 0.4 *indicates projects that yield negative net present value for at least one party. Such projects will not be implemented.
@indicates no solution i.e projects that yield negative net present value to the initial syndicate. Such projects will not be implemented. The syndicate provides financing on competitive terms (NP V = 0) whenever V 1 exceeds the strike value V 1 , which is higher than in the monopoly case shown in Figure 3 . The syndicate's optimal share is lower than the maximum share at which the entrepreneur would still participate. The ownership shares held by the entrepreneur and incumbent venture capitalist increase with V 1 . 
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